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The interface between financial and real decisions may be a source of
distortions if outside investors or providers of debt do not have the same information
as the firms undertaking innovation and investment projects. This effect is well-
documented in theoretical models. Over the last 10 years, a large number of studies
have appeared which also provide empirical support for the notion of financing
constraints.
Previous studies on financing constraints in Germany have mostly used panel
data on large publicly traded firms. For these enterprises, little or no evidence has
been produced that would point to the existence of financing constraints. Conversely,
studies using survey data on smaller firms, but often employing no or less convincing
controls for latent heterogeneity have consistently produced evidence that such
constraints may exist. Moreover, there has been no study focusing on the potential
impact of financing constraints on R&D expenditures of firms. This paper addresses
these issues by employing a sample which mostly consists of manufacturing firms
not traded in the German stock market. Moreover, since these firms perform R&D,
data on R&D expenditures can be used to study the relationship between financing
and innovation activities, and to compare the results to those from an analysis of
investment and finance.
In a first step, I employ accelerator and error-correction model (ECM)
specifications as suggested by Bond et al (1997). While cash flow effects are quite
strong in the accelerator models, allowing for more complex adjustment mechanisms
in the ECM regressions weakens their effects. However, in the case of R&D
expenditures significant, but relatively small effects remain for a subset of relatively
small firms. In the case of investment in physical capital, the smallest firms are again
characterized by such liquidity effects.
There are a number of problems with the interpretation of the relationship
between cash flow and investment. In particular, a firm that has entered into a new
and profitable market is likely to experience relatively high cash flow which may
signal further profitable investment opportunities. Thus, cash flow is also an indicator
of furture investment opportunities and therefore a potential determinant of
investment demand. While some of this effect may be captured in output growth, the
potential for endogeneity biases remains. The paper therefore develops an
alternative theoretical framework which is not susceptible to this ambiguity. Based on
previous work by Bond and Meghir (1994), I derive an Euler equation framework with
Euler equations for investment and for R&D. In this framework, the equations that
have been derived should correctly describe the investment and R&D behavior of
firms if the underlying assumptions, in particular the absence of any financing
constraints, hold.
However, the empirical evidence produced by the Euler equ'ations is not
completely convincing. The Euler equations are closer to the expected results for
large firms (as they should if these are not financing-constrained), but fail completely
for smaller firms (which would be expected if these firms are financing-constrained).
Yet, it is likely that deviations from the expected results for large firms are partly
driven by econometric and measurement problems.
Thus, in order to answer the question whether the liquidity effects captured in
the accelerator and ECM specifications really reflect financing constraints, I also use
complementary data from an innovation survey. In this survey, firms were asked
directly whether a lack of debt or equity finance was an impediment for investment
and innovation projects. These data are matched at the firm level to the sample usedhere. Again, they suggest that the smaller firms in the matched subsample are much
more likely to indicate that financing constraints exist.
There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from this paper. First, for a
German sample of this size and for the time period under consideration. only the
very smallest firms appear to be affected by financing constraints. This implication
holds both for investment and for R&D. If one simply uses a sample of publicly
traded companies. there should be little evidence of such constraints. Thus the
results are consistent with ~hose of earlier studies of publicly traded firms (e.g. Bond
et al. 1997). but the size effects detected here are also consistent with the results
produced by studies using survey data on small and medium-sized firms. Finally, the
liquidity effects detected for the small firms are consistent with direct evidence from
survey questions. Thus, they appear to reflect real financial constraints, rather than
econometric artefacts.Are There Financing Constraints for
R&D and Investment in German
Manufacturing Firms?
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Abstract
Using a newly constructed panel dataset of German enterprises, I
estimate R&D and capital investment equations for the time period
from 1990 to 1994. Simple accelerator specifications indicate consi~er­
able sensitivity ofR&D and investment to cash flow for relatively small
firms. Much of this effect vanishes already once error-correcting
behavior is taken into account, but a significant positive relationship
between cashflow and investment remains for relatively small firms. In
the case of R&D, weak but significant cash flow persist both for small
and large firms. The evidence from Euler equation estimates is not
conclusive. The investment Euler equation for large firms appears to
perform relatively well and yields results close to those expected under
the null hypothesis ofno financing constraints. The estimates from the
Euler equation for R&D are not informative. Additional evidence from
survey data suggests that the cash flow sensitivity of investment in
small firms is likely to reflect financing constraints.
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This paper is concerned with an aspect of firm behavior that has only recently
reemerged as a central problem in corporate finance and industrial organization - the
potential existence offinancing constraints and their implications for investment and
innovation at the firm and the aggregate level. As early as in the Sixties, a number of
researchers (e.g., Meyer and Kuh (1957), Duesenberry (1958), Meyer and Glauber
(1964» had proposed informal theories of liquidity and investment and had tried to
test these models empirically. But the notion of financing constraints did not receive
major support among economists until highly influential papers byJaffee and Russell
(1976), Keeton (1979), and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) pointed to possible equilibrium
credit rationing by lenders. The key assumption driving the results of these papers.
concerns asymmetric information between borrower and lender. Papers by Myers and
Majluff (1984) and Myers (1977, 1984) also suggested a causal relationship between
asymmetric information and the firm's preference for internal finance.
The paper by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988Y has been the first empirical
study explicitly building on these theoretical contributions. Since then, there has
been a large number of empirical investigations in this field, mostly focusing on
financing constraints for capital investment. The overall picture is still clouded by
difficult econometric and conceptual problems. In a recent debate, some doubts have
been expressed that the cash flow effects detected by these studies can be interpreted
as evidence offinancing constraints (Kaplan and Zingales 1997). In any case, it has
been difficult to quantify the extent of these constraints precisely, or to assess their
interaction with the institutional framework, e.g. the role ofintermediaries in general
and ofbanks in particular: Therefore it is still difficult to gauge the overall economic
implications offinancing constraints in a reliable manner.
Investment in capital goods may not be the only firm activity where financing
constraints can be of importance. Actually, since investments in intangible assets
(like know-how or consumer goodwill) are presumably more risky and provide less
collateral to lenders than capital goods do, liquidity effects might be even more
pronounced for these activities. Grabowski (1968) provided some early cross-sectional
support for this view, while Mueller (1967) and Hamburg (1966) did not find such an
effect. In more recent work, Bernstein and Nadiri (1986), Hall (1992), Hao and Jaffe
(1993), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), and Kathuria and Mueller (1995) have
produced evidence that liquidity effects may also be at work in determining R&D
activities. But the evidence on this point is still very tentative and warrants further
attention, given that R&D is already subject to a number ofexternalities which may
lead to under-investment in a market economy.
Due to data constraints, the empirical evidence for Germany has been particularly
scarce. A few studies have analyzed the financing aspects of capital investment in
Germany (Elston 1995, Elston and Albach 1994, Audretsch and Elston 1994). These
investigations have been based on the Bonn Database which contains comprehensive
data on publicly traded German enterprises. These studies have pointed to the
existence of cash flow effects for the investment activities of even the largest
enterprises, but have so far excluded the firm's innovation activities. Moreover, only
the investment behavior of publicly traded firms has been analyzed so far. This may
not be a serious problem in the United States where a relatively large number of
small and medium-sized firms have access to equities markets. It is definitely aconcern in Germany where access to the stock market is tight and market
capitalization is relatively low. The prominent role that·small and medium-sized
firms take in the Ge-;man economy makes a study of their investment and R&D
behavior an appealing exercise.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the relationship between
finance and investment behavior using a new dataset describing the R&D and
investment decisions of German firms, including independent medium-sized
enterprises whose shares are not traded in the stock market. In the first part ofthe
empirical exercise, I estimate accelerator and error-correction models for investment
and R&D. The cash flow effects obtained from these regressions cannot be interpreted
without ambiguity. ~n particular, cash flow may alsR be correlated with investment
opportunities. 1 It is nonetheless instructive to study the variation of these
coefficients across firms ofdifferent size. Below -I present results which suggest that
the investment policies of smaller firms are indeed more sensitive to cash flow
variations than those ofrelatively large firms. In order to test whether these results
from accelerator and error-correction models point to the existence of financial
constraints, I also implement structural Euler equation models for investment and
R&D, but the results are unfortunately not satisfactory. What remains in terms of
results is evidence of size-contingent cash flow effects for investment and R&D.
Additional evidence from other data sources suggests that this effect actually mirrors
financing constraints at the firm level.
The paper proceeds as follows. Theoretical aspects and some previous empirical
results will be summarized briefly in section 2. In section 3, I describe the data used
in this study and central descriptive statistics. Three econometric specifications are
discussed briefly in section 4, and estimation results are presented in section 5: The
central results are based on accelerator and error-correction specifications, but I also
derive and estimate Euler equations for R&D and investment. The final section
summarizes the results and concludes with a number ofsuggestions for further work.
2 THEORETICALASPECTSAND PREVIOUS STUDIES
2.1 Asymmetric Information, CreditRationingandFinancing
Hierarchies
Credit markets are different from standard commodity markets in that the lender
delivers a loan on the borrower's promise to pay back the loan and interest. The
lender's evaluation ofthe borrower's capability to pay back is crucial fo\the lending
The interpretation of cash flow as an indicator of investment oppotunities is not the only
alternative explanation at hand. As Jensen (1985) has argued, managers may have incentives to let
finns grow beyond optimal size. Cash flow in excess ofwhat is needed to fund the optimal level of
investmentwill then not be turned over to share-holders, but managers will invest at below the cost
of capital. In such a case, externally imposed financing constraints may actually have positive
implications in that they prevent management from making such investments. The Jensen
hypothesis is clearly a serious contender in interpreting what the implications of financing
constraints will be. But the paper presented here will - for now - merely attempt to explore whether
there is reason to believe that suchconstraints exist.decision.2 Equilibrium quantity rationing thus emerges endogenously due to
asymmetric information (the lender knows less about the borrower than the borrower
herself) and incompleteness of contracts (contractual agreements to control all
aspects ofborrower behavior are infeasible), In the case of rationing, the lender will
decide not to grant a loan to the borrower, even if the borrower offers a higher
interest rate than is observed in the market for loans. Thus, the supply ofloans does
not equate the demand at the market interest rate.
The underlying logic for all credit rationing phenomena are the self-selection and
incentive effects imposed by interest rates. Adverse selection occurs, since the
average quality ofborrowers will be a decreasing function ofthe'interest rate charged
by the lender. Moreover, as the interest rate increases the borrower will be tempted
to undertake riskier projects unless the loan is fully collateralized. In this context,
there may exist an interest rate that maximizes the lender's profit although supply
does not equal demand. Either some lenders are not able to obtain any loan, or the
loan size will be below the one demanded by the borrower (Bester and Hellwig 1987).
Asymmetric information may also lead managers not to issue new equity. In an
influential paper, Myers and Majluf (1984) analyze the effect of asymmetric
information if managers have privileged knowledge about the true value of invest-
ment projects and the firm's other assets while investors (or lenders) only know the
joint distribution of these values until the ex ante random characteristics of the
projects are revealed. Managers are assumed to act on behalf of existing
shareholders. Managers will issue new shares only ifthis is not to the disadvantage
of existing stockholders, i.e. if the market's evaluation ofthe new stock is above the
respective value for the existing stockholders. Thus, managers will only issue shares
-for investments with less,than expected value. Consequently, issuing shares will be
seen by the new investors as a bad signal. Anticipating this, the firm will not issue
new shares even if the projects have positive net present value. Thus, financing
constraints have negative welfare effects in this model.3
The conclusions that can be derived from the MyerslMajluf and other models are
quite strong. Given that management acts in the interest of existing shareholders,
firms will prefer internal finance over debt financing, and debt financing over the
issuance of new shares. Furthermore, issuing new shares will typically lead to a
decline in the stock price. Both predictions have found some empirical support.4 As a
result of some of these arguments, Myers and Majluf (1984), inter alia, have
postulated a financial "pecking order" model which deviates considerably from either
the static equity-debt tradeoff model or the ranking of capital costs suggested by
Auerbach (1983). Once slack resources are exhausted, the firm will have to borrow to
satisfy its capital needs. The most expensive type of capital will be new equity. In
some cases, the firm will rather forego an investment opportunity than to issue debt.
Variations in cash flow will lead to more investment in such a situation. Note that in
2
4
For surveys, see Clemenz (1986), Baltensperger and Devinney (1985), and Bester and Hellwig
(1987).
Variations of the fundamental theme of the MyerslMajluf paper have been developed in large
numbers, but the basic idea is the same in these extensions. For example, Krasker (1986), Besanko
and Thakor (1987), Thakor (1993).
See the review ofempirical evidence in Thakor (1993, p. 461).
4the pecking order model, there is no well-defined optimal capital structure as it exists
in'the static Modigliani-Miller model with taxation. The model developed by Myers
and Majlufdoes not directly relate long-term capital structure, but the availability of
slack resources to investment spending. Indirectly, though, the model suggests a
motive for pt:ecautionary corporate saving ("cash stock-piling"),
In another paper, Myers (1977) also comments on the relationship between capital
structure and the nature of the firm's projects. Suppose that the true value of the
firm is given by the value of its assets in place and the value of future investment
opportunities. The extent to which the latter can be exploited depends on
discretionary spending by the firm's management. In essence these opportunities
represent call options. Suppose that the firm issues risky debt to finance such an
investment opportunity. The existence of risky debt introduces a wedge between the
firm's marginal value and the marginal value ofequity. On average, this will lead to
underinvestment. The stock market's evaluation of the prospective behavior of the
shareholders will lead to an ex ante reduction of the value of the firm. Moreover,
lending may be rationed in this context. To rational lenders and equity owners the
value of a firm with relatively important growth opportunities will decline with
leverage. Myers concludes that the more the firm's value is determined by future
investment opportunities relative to assets in place, the more it will favor equity
financing in order to avoid the underinvestment effect. In empirical terms, this
theory suggests that innovative firms with few assets already in place (say small
companies with a promising new product, but no established products) should be
mostly equity-financed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to test this theory
thoroughly, butit is an interesting question to be pursued in future work.
2.2 DifferentTypesofInvestment: Capital Goods versus Know-How
It is by now generally acknowledged that externalities in the form ofinformation or
knowledge "spillovers" playa potentially important role in shaping the incentives for
research and development activities (R&D) of private firms. Much less is known
about the potential effects of financing constraints on innovation. Can liquidity
constraints - ifthey exist - be particularly important for investments in research and
development (R&D) or innovation projects? The literature lists a number of reasons
why investment in physical capital and investment in knowledge capital should be
affected differently by financing constraints, and why obtaining external finance for
innovation and R&D projects may be more costly than obtaining such funding for
capital investment. At the same time, fundamental technological differences with
respect to the adjustment costs of investment and R&D may work against
pronounced sensitivity ofR&D spending to transitory shocks in cash flqw.
As Hall (1992) points out, contrary to most capital investment goods (plant, property,
and equipment), R&D results such as a new prototype or a design cannot be used
easily as collateral. The investment share ofR&D expenditures is on the order often
per cent of total R&D expenditures, and most inputs to the innovation process are
likely to be firm-specific or specific to the new product or process to be developed.
Thus, an external financier cannot expect to recover a significant share ofher funds if
it is used to finance an innovation project.Second, for obvious reasons firms are unlikely to reveal content and objectives oftheir
R&D efforts, since this knowledge may leak out to competitors.5 Strategic
considerations of this kind will tend to maintain and reinforce informational
asymmetries. But even without secrecy undermining the incentives to share
information about R&D projects, the evaluation of long-term risky projects by
external financiers may be more costly than the assessment of more short-term
oriented ones. Thus, if providers of finance face greater uncertainty with respect to
R&D than to investment projects, they will require a higher lemon's premium for the
former type ofinvestment. Hence, even without rationing behavior on behalfofbanks
and other financial institutions, there will be a premium to be paid for obtaining
external funding. This is of course the classical argument that leads Myers and
Majluff (1984) to postulating a financial hierarchy in which internal funds are the
cheapest source of capital. If lenders cannot control which kind of project will be
financed by the loan, then the cost ofcapital will reflect the financiers' assessment of
average project risk.
While the above arguments may suggest that R&D will be more susceptible to cash
flow variations, there are other considerations that work in the opposite direction. It
is likely that the R&D process cannot be delayed or accelerated to the extent to which
this may be possible for capital investment. Scientists cannot be fired and rehired
without substantial loss of human capital to the firm (and potential gains to
competitors), and due to their high degree of specialization, resources employed in
R&D cannot simply be used in production (or vice versa). Thus, adjustment costs are
likely to be higher for R&D than for investment. We would expect to see relatively
high persistence in R&D data - an expectation that is indeed born out by the
,empirical evidence (e.g., Lach and Schankerman 1989). Moreover, this effect will
actually dampen the long-term response ofR&D to cash flow variation.
However, the extent ofadjustment costs may well be a function ofthe type ofprojects
undertaken - and thus a choice variable for firm managers. Ifa firm anticipates that
its cash flow may be highly fluctuating and that external finance will not be available
to fund R&D projects, then the respective R&D budget may favor projects that have a
relatively short duration or are relatively flexible in terms of adjustment opportuni-
ties. One branch of the theoretical literature has considered the effect of different
project duration for investor response and managerial choices. Shleifer and Vishny
(1990) show that if long-term projects stay mis-priced for a longer period than
projects with short duration, then managers may select short-term projects. Thakor
(1993) distinguishes between "late bloomer" projects (high payoffin the more distant
future) and "early winners" (projects with lower returns in the near future). If
managers care about existing stockholders, then the stock price reaction to an equity
issue for a "late bloomer" project will be negative while it might be positiv;e for the
other type ofproject. R&D projects are - when compared to investment projects - such
late bloomers (Thakor 1993). But R&D itself may be heterogeneous, and managers
may be able to choose short-term R&D projects over ultimately more profitable long-
term ones iffinancing constraints are anticipated. A sequence of short-term projects
can be adjusted far more easier than long-term projects which cannot be accelerated
or slowed down without some penalty.
5 See Mansfield (1985) for some evidence on the speed of information dissemination. Theoretical
models of knowledge dissemination are presented by Bhattacharya and Ritter (1985) and
Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1994),As mentioned before, there are only few studies to date that have analyzed the
potential impact offinancing constraints on the firm's innovation policy. Hall (1992)
finds that the elasticity ofinvestment and R&D with respect to cash flow is positive
and significant in a large sample of U.S. manufacturing firms. Interestingly, the
results suggest that the effect on investment is stronger than the effect on R&D. She
computes long-term cash flow elasticity values of 0.46 for investment and 0.28 for
R&D spending. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) present an investigation of the
effect of financing constraints on relatively small U.S. firms in high-technology
industries. The elasticities (at the sample mean) implied by their estimates are
noteworthy: in the case of investment, Himmelberg and Petersen calculate a cash
flow elasticity of 0.83. For R&D, the elasticity is on the order of0.36. Investment in
these companies appears to react to transitory movements in cash flow, while R&D
expenditures are being smoothed according to the permanent component ofcash flow.
Himmelberg and Petersen argue that firms face relatively large adjustment costs in
their R&D activities and cannot adjust the intensity of these efforts to short-term
liquidity shocks. As argued before, these results are subject to the critique that cash
flow effects cannot be interpreted unambiguously as indicators of financial
constraints.
2.3 Firm Size and FinancingOpportunities
Firm size plays a central role in this study. I argue in this paper that small firms are
more likely to be characterized by excess sensitivity to the availability of internal
finance.8 First, smaller firms will be characterized by idiosyncratic risk which would
raise the cost ofexternal capital. In addition, a randomly chosen group ofsmall firms
will include a relatively large number ofyoung firms, hence outside investors may not
yet have sufficient information to distinguish good from bad performers. Second,
these firms may also have more limited access to external financial markets, in
particular in Germany where access to the stock market is limited. Third, these firms
have less collateral (in terms of existing assets) which could be used for obtaining
external loans. Moreover, smaller firms may employ more flexibly adjustable R&D
and investment processes than large firms do. Thus, the response to liquidity effects
should be faster, i.e. the respective processes should display less persistence, even
after accounting for presumably larger fluctuations in sales or other determinants of
investment. .
While there is a considerable number of studies looking at the relationship between
investment, finance and firm size7 only very little evidence is available on the impact
offirm size on the finance-R&D relationship. Hao and Jaffe (1993) find evidence that
small firms' R&D expenditures react more strongly to measures of cash flow or
working capital than R&D performed by larger enterprises. However, they do not
compare R&D and investment behavior, and their empirical test does not take
adjustment processes into account. Winker (1996) uses managerial survey responses
as indicators of financial constraints. He finds that managers are more likely to
indicate that their firms are financially constrained if the respective firm is small,
and if demand expectations are positive. In regressions using investment and
8
7
These arguments are neither new nor original. See, for example, Schiantarelli (1995, pp. 31-33) and
the references cited therein.
See Schiantarelli (1995) for a summaryofresults.innovation expenditures as the dependent variables, the financial constraints
variables yield a significant negative effect.
3 DATA SOURCE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
3.1 Data Sour«;es and Data Collection
Data on R&D expenditures at the, firm level are difficult to obtain in Germany. In
previous work, I used the most comprehensive database - provided by the
Stifterverband ftir die Deutsche Wissenschaft - to study productivity and spillover
effects (Harhoff 1996, 1997). Containing detailed information on the firm's R&D
expenditures and their breakdown, those data do unfortunately not contain
information on the financial performance of firms. For the purpose of this study, an
entirely new panel dataset was constructed from publicly available sources and
complemented - ifnecessary - with confidential data from the Mannheim Innovation
Panel. The most important public source for R&D information were financial
statements, published in the Bundesanzeiger. In some cases additional data were
obtained from yearly business reports. The final dataset is an unbalanced panel of
236 German firms and covers the period from 1987 to 1994. Due to the recession of
the German economy following the reunification boom, the data span a period that is
characterized by rather divergent business conditions and considerable changes in
firms' liquidity.
Details regarding sample composition, variable definitions and other important
aspects of "data cleaning" are relegated in the data appendix. Due to a number of
.excl~sionrestrictions,' the initial sample of about 2300 observations of R&D
expenditure data shrinks to a sample of 1755 observations and 299 firms. Applying
the constraint that at least three consecutive observations have to exist on all
relevant variables and using "cleaning" procedures described in the appendix, we
have finally a sample of 1365 observations for 236 firms. There are seven or eight
observations for 90 firms; another 86 firms have either 5 or 6 observations; and 60
firms have either 3 or 4 observations. The sectoral composition of the panel is
described in Table'1. It reflects the particular specialization of German industry in
the production ofchemicals and pharmaceuticals, machinery, and electrical products
quite well - 161 ofthe total of236 firms are operating in these sectors.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
This paragraph briefly describes the sample in terms ofits properties and descriptive
statistics. A number ofpoints need to be stated at the outset. First, the sample is not
representative. Quite to the contrary, it has emerged from a complex selection
process. Moreover, German corporate law gives firms some leeway in choosing how to
comment on their R&D activities. The reporting may range from precise data on
expenditures, R&D personnel and patenting activity to simple comments like "R&D
was performed." Only firms with information that would allow the computation of
R&D expenditures are included in the sample. Nonetheless, due to the inclusion of
large enterprises, the sample captures in each ofthe years from 1987 to 1994 slightly
more than 50 percent of private R&D spending in the Federal Republic. This is not
surprising, given the concentration ofR&D spending in large firms.Table 2 presents means, medians and the interquartile ranges ofthe most important
variables. Most distributions are highly skewed due to the presence of very large
enterprises.·At the median of the 1990 sample, firms have sales of about DM 445
million (in 1985 prices). The size distribution thus seriously restricts the possibility of
analyzing financing problems ofsmall firms. The empirical strategy to do so with this
sample relies on splitting the sample at the .median of the initial year sales
distribution..The lower quartile ofthe 1990 sales distribution for smaller firms is at
DM 95 million, the upperquartile at DM 260 million.
The overall sample is also fairly research-intensive. The mean ofR&D intensity (real
R&D expenditures divided by real sales) is 5.1 percent. This is considerably above the
average R&D intensity among German R&D-performing firms which is on the order
of2.2 percent. Figure 1 plots the R&D intensity distribution ofall firms with data for
1990. The shape of the distribution conforms to the plots presented by Cohen and
Klepper (1992) for the United States: it is roughly unimodal and skewed to the left.
The firm's willingness to reveal its R&D expenditures in a consistent way may be
correlated with the firm's size and the extent ofinnovation in the industry. For small,
specialized firms any revelation ofthe extent ofinnovation may generate information
for competitors that may be deemed harmful by the firm's management, thus leading
to a preference for secrecy. As to the above-average R&D intensity, it is well-known
that pharmaceutical and chemical companies have published R&D-related data for
some decades. In some industries, the signalling value of revealing the firm's R&D
expenditures may be significant. As Table 1 shows, the dominant industries in the
sample used here are indeed chemicals and pharmaceuticals, electrical products, and
machinery. Simple productivity regressions also show that the elasticity ofrevenues
with respect to the R&D capital stock is on the order of 10 percent in fixed-effects
estimates. This result is consistent with elasticities computed for a panel offirms in
high-technology industries in the Stifterverband data (Harhoff1997, Table 4). Table 2
suggests that the sample firms spend on average slightly less on R&D than on
investment. In conclusion, R&D is an important activity for the firms in this sample.
The key feature ofthe dataset is the linking offinancial performance data with R&D
and investment expenditure information. Partial correlation coefficients can be used
to establish a number ofstylized facts. In simple OLS regressions using R&D scaled
over capital as the dependent variable and including time dummies,firm size, and
revenue growth among the right-hand side variables, the coefficient (standard error)
ofcash flow is 0.45 (0.012). Using investment over capital as the dependent variable,
the respective cash flow coefficient (standard error) is given by 0.12 (0.011). Including
detailed industry dummy variables at the two-digit SYPRO level does not change
these results by much. Thus, after controlling for observable firm charac'teristics, the
cross-sectional relationship between cash flow and R&D is much stronger than
between cash flow and investment in tangible capital.
A causal interpretation of this correlation is obviously subject to a number of
problems. First, the OLS estimates completely neglect the possibility that firm-
specific effects can render the estimated coefficients inconsistent. For example, the
relationship between cash flow and R&D may be spurious, since profitability (and
thus cash flow) may simply be correlated with the extentoffirm-specific technological
opportunities, and therefore with the firm's propensity to invest in R&D. Second,
since the symmetric treatment of R&D and investment requires a correction of the
cash flow variable (R&D has been expensed and must be added back to cash flow),
9measurement error in the R&D variable will lead to a positive, but meaningless
correlation. These complications will be addressed below in more refined dynamic
specifications.
As pointed out in the previous section, it would be interesting to compare the capital
structure of firms with respect to the kind of investments undertaken by these
enterprises. Most ofthe theoretical arguments presented in section 2 imply that debt
finance is not conducive to R&D spending. To explore the relationship between
capital structure and the firm's investment policy, the correlation between debt and
R&D spending (or R&D capital stock) can be analyzed. This has not been undertaken
in a systematic way in this project, but preliminary results indicate that the
correlation between R&D activity (measured as the ratio ofR&D capital over the sum
of R&D capital and physical capital) and the firm's longterm debt (measured as
longterm debt divided by the sum ofR&D capital and physical capital) is consistently
negative in all years. The respective correlation coefficients appear to range between
-0.05 and -0.15 and are thus weaker than the negative correlations found in US data
by Hall (1992) which were on the order of-0.2 to -0.3.8 A more detailed analysis ofthe
link between capital structure and innovation' in this-sample is left to a separate
study.
4 ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATIONS FOR INVESTMENT AND
R&D SPENDING
This section briefly describes the econometric framework used in the analysis. While
cash flow-investment elasticities areambiguous,non~structural models like
accelerator (section 4.1) or error-correction specifications (section 4.2) are nonetheless
informative starting points. Clearer evidence should in principle come from a
structural Euler equation model introduced in section 4.3.
4.1 AcceleratorModels
Investment accelerator specifications have been used, inter alia, by Bond et al.
(1994). The derivation of such a model follows the usual logic which postulates a
relationship between the logarithm ofoutput Yi,r, the logarithm of the desired stock
ofcapital ci,t, and the user cost ofcapital ht
(1) Ci,t = a + Yi,t - 0'ht.
This model can be derived from a profit maximization problem, give~ aCES
production function with elasticity of substition 0'. By taking first differences and
applying the usual approximation .1 Ci,t :::: Ii,t/ Ki,t-l - () one arrives at
(2)
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The results are preliminary, since the balance sheet data used so far are too coarse to adjust the
debt variable for reserve holdings for pensions. Such a correction is currently under way.
10where Ii,t is investment, Ci,t-J is the firm's capital stock and 8 is the rate of
depreciation. In the empirical specifications, the user cost ofcapital are modelled as a
function of time dummy variables and firm-specific effects. Following Bond et al.
(1994), I use a generalized dynamic version which nests equation (2) in the empirical
equation
(3)
where ef.1 is an error term, d! represents time dummies, and 1]{ captures
unobserved·heterogeneity at the firm level. The inclusion of cash flow effects then
renders the basic empirical specification
(4a)
I· I· ] CF CF]
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The corresponding R&D equation can be derived in the same way by treating R&D
and investment completely symetrically. Thus,
R· R·] CF CF.·]
(4b) _1_,I_=pR~+RRt'.3,y. + ARt'.3,y. _ +AR__ I,_I+RR~+dR+nl?+El? K K P] 1,1 P2 1,1] P3 K P4 K I 'II 1,1
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Here, Ri,l denotes the firm's R&D expenditures and Ki,l is the respective
"knowledge" capital stock. The computation of this variable and potential
complications are described in the data appendix.
These equations can be estimated in first differences in order to eliminate the firm-
specific effects. Arellano and Bond (1991) describe a family ofGMM estimators which
can be employed for this purpose and have a number ofdesirable properties. Since we
want to allow for endogenous relationships between the right-hand sidevariables anc!.
the error terms, suitable instruments have to be devised to estimate the equation.
Arellano and Bond suggest using lagged values ofthe right-hand sidevariables and of
the autoregressive term. Ifthe original error term Ei,l follows a white noise process,
then values (in levels) of these variables lagged two or more periods will be
admissible instruments. Ifthe error term has a moving average structure, longer lags
will have to be considered. Arellano and Bond describe a number ,of test statistics
that can be used to test for violations ofvarious assumptions, in pa~ticularfor serial
autocorrelation and validity ofthe instruments.9
4.2 Error-CorrectionModels
Bond et al. (1994) follow Bean (1981) and nest equation (1) directly in an error-
correction framework ofthe type
9 For details on the estimation technique, see Arellano and Bond (1991).
II(5a)
(5b)
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which has equation (1) as its long-run solution. Negative estimates for the coefficients
<l>R and <1>1 would indicate error-correcting behavior for the respective type of
investment. Since (5a) and (5b) also nest the respective accelerator models, this
specifation is particularly convenient. Deviations from.constant returns can be tested
by including the logarithm of output as an additional regressor in (5a) and (5b).
Deviations of the respective coefficient from zero would indicate a violation of the
constant-returns assumption (see Bean 1981).
4.3 EulerEquations
Due to the aforementioned ambiguities regarding the interpretation ofthe cash flow
effects in reduced-form equations, possibly significant cash flow coefficients in the
accelerator and error-correction specifications are not fully convincing. In particular,
they cannot unambiguously be interpreted as evidence for financing constraints, since
cash flow may be correlated with investment demand.
It is therefore desirable to employ a structural framework in order to confirm or
reject findings from the accelerator and error correction equation models. Such
models have been used successfully by Bond and Meghir (1994) and Whited (1992),
among others. Including R&D activity in a structural estimation approach requires
that the theoretical framework encompass at leastlO two distinct types of capital
(knowledge capital and tangible capital). Studies of this type are still rare in the
literaturell, but such a model - based on the work of Bond and Meghir (1994) - is
derived and described in the appendix where I show that - under suitable




It is not clear that labor can be treated as adjustable without causing adjustment costs to the firm.
This problem applies obviously to industries with high human capital, but it could be particularly
pronounced in the Federal Republic which heavily restricts employer's ability to layoffworkers. The
Euler equation model in the appendix is in principle amenable to an extension which would allow
for costs in adjusting the labor force, but such an extension is beyond the scope ofthis paper.
See the survey by Chirinko (l993a). Chirinko (l993b) estimates a model with multiple capital
stocks on the basis ofthe q approach.
12(6a)
Analogously, one can derive the empirical equation for the firm's R&D spending
(6b)
In these equatiol),s, K is the knowledge capital stQ.ck, and C is the stock of physical
capital, I is investment in physical capital and R the firm's R&D expenditures. Y
denotes the firm's output (measured as sales) and X is the firm's gross profit.12 For
both equations, the theoretical model yields the parameter restrictions ~J >1, ~2 <-1,
~3 <0, ~4 >0, ~5 >0, and \~6 < O. Details are provided in the appendix. These
coefficients are themselves functions of underlying structural parameters. However,
as in most other papers using Euler equations ofthis type, the resulting restrictions
across coefficients will not be tested orenforced in this paper.
The Euler equations derived in the appendix specify investment and R&D equations
under the null hypothesis of no financing constraints. There is no explicit structural
model ofthe firm's investment behavior under the alternative. The logic oftesting the
model is the following. Presumably, if financing constraints exist for at least a
subsample of firms, then the parameter restrictions just described will not be
satisfied. Moreover, in that case other specification tests, e.g. the Sargan test and
tests for serial correlation may also yield significant test statistics.ISIfthe subsample
of firms affected by financing constraints can be identified, then separate estimates
for the respective groups of firms should lead to a rejection in one case, and
acceptance of the Euler equations in the other. In practice, it may be difficult to
achieve a full acceptance of the model, since any deviation from the assumptions
underlying the structural model may lead to deviations from the expected coefficient
patterns. Thus, obtaining the right signs on the parameters and moving closer to the
expected coefficient size after the sample-split has been implemented can be seen as
an imperfect, but still positive result.
12 See the data appendix and the derivation of the Euler equations for details on the variable
definition.
IS Fordetails on the logic oftesting these models see Zeldes (1989) and Bond and Meghir (1994).
135 ESTIMATION RESULTS
5.1 Accelerator and Error-Correction Models
In Table 3, I report estimates based on the accelerator specifications in equations (4a)
and (4b). In the overall sample, there are significant cash flow effects in investment,
but not in R&D spending. Splitting the sample according to size reveals a more
complex pattern. Apparently, the significant effects in the investment equation are
driven by the subsample of smaller firms where cash flow effects remain highly
significant while there is no statistically significant effect for the subsample oflarger
firms. A similar result is obtained for the R&D equations, but the associated cash
flow coefficients are considerably smaller. The test statistics for these results do not
suggest any problems with the choice ofinstruments and/or their time structure. The
Sargan test statistic is never significant at the 5 percent level, nor are the tests for
second order serial correlation. However, one should note that the output accelerator
effects are not particularly convincing ifthe underlying model is taken at face value.
These coefficients are"either quite small and typically insignificant, or they carry the
wrong sign. This may indicate a problem with the choice of the output variables
(sales) which does not account for changes in inventories or with the industry-specific
sales deflators used in this study.14
The implications of allowing for error-correcting behavior are analyzed in Table 4.
Note that this equation nests the previous specification. The error correction terms
have the expected negative signs, and they are significant in all equations, except for
the investment equations for the overall sample and the group of smaller firms. The
test statistics do not point to any misspecification, once the equations are estimated
separately for the two subsamples. However, it is disturbing that the coefficient of
log(Yt-z) is also significantly negative in most of the columns of Table 4. This would
suggest strong decreasing returns to scale which appears implausible. Again, this
effect might be triggered by problems with the output variable used in this study or
by the fact that the time series is too short. One can enforce the constant returns to
scale assumption in these data by simply omitting the variable log(Yt-z), but this does
not change the coefficients of the remaining variables strongly, although cash flow
effects become slightly stronger in the restricted specification. For larger firms, the
accelerator terms assume reasonable values in Table 4.
For the ECM specification, there is little evidence of any cash flow effects for
investment or R&D in the overall sample. The test statistic for the joint test of the
cash flow terms in the investment and R&D equations is insignificant. The admission
of error-correcting behavior appears to lead to lower cash flow effects in ,all of the
specifications. For smaller and larger firms, cash flow does not appear to have a
significant effect on investment. However, in the R&D equation, there are significant
cash flow effects for both subsamples. The cash flow coefficients are considerably
larger for the smaller companies, but their overall size 0.079 (=0.050+0.029) is still
quite small.
Experimenting with different sample splits provided evidence of a size-contingent
cash flow effect in the subsample ofsmaller firms. In Table 4, the significance level of
14 For firms that sell products from accumulated stocks, output is biased upwards, and vice versa for
firms accumulating stocks offinished and semi-finished products.
14the test statistic for the joint effect ofcash flow variables in the investment equation
for smaller firms is p=O.077. Reestimating the error-correction model for investment
with a sample split into three groups (see Table 5) yields significant cash flow effects
at the confidence level ofp=0.005 for the group consisting ofthe 71 smallest firms in
the sample while no significant effects emerge for the two other groups. Moreover, it
is interesting that error-correcting behavior appears to be relevant for the investment
decisions of larger firms, but not for the very smallest firms in this sample. This
result would support the presumption that smaller firms employ rather flexible
investment processes. As to the R&D equations, splitting the sample into three
groups did not provide qualitatively new results. Small but significant cash flow
effects persist, and they tend to be slightly larger for the smaller firms.
These results suggest that the data may not be suitable to'test for financing
constraints: ifthey are present and indeed apparent in the form ofcash flow effects,
they are likely to affect only the very smallest firms in this sample. This does not
mean that these firms are of little relevance: small and medium-sized firms with
fewer than 500 employees constitute the lion's share of Germany's firm population
and account for about 70 percent of employment, and a reliable assessment of their
financing situation would be quite important. But these firms tend to be
systematically underrepresented in financial accounts data ofthe form used here.
Summarizing the results from the accelerator and error correction specifications used
here, there is some evidence pointing to size-contingent cash flow effects, both for
R&D and investment. These effects persist even after accounting for relatively
complex adjustment dynamics, although the effects are clearly reduced in size once
such adjustment mechanisms are allowed for. This result has been described before
by Bond et al. (1997). Even without attempting to interpret the cash flow effects in
one way or another, one lesson from these results is certainly that simple linear
specifications (such as the accelerator model) will tend to deliver inflated cash flow
effects, and that the results from studies not introducing more complex (and
presumably realistic) adjustment processes ought to be viewed with caution.
5.2 EulerEquation Results
Results from Euler equation estimates for investment in tangible capital are
presented in the left-hand panel ofTable 6. The GMM technique used in the previous
sections is again chosen to estimate the equations. In each case I start with the
assumption that values ofthe right-hand side variables lagged two or more years are
admissible instruments. Both the admissibility of instruments and the serial
correlation structure are tested. If serial correlation of second order is detected, the
error term in (6a) or (6b) may be MA(l), and valid instruments have to be lagged at
least three periods. The choice of instruments is indicated in the last line of each
column in Table 6.
For the overall sample, the coefficient estimates are nowhere close to their expected
size, and in many cases the signs do not correspond to the theoretical predictions.
This should be expected iffinancing constraints are present. But it is more likely that
it indicates general data problems, or simply some mismatch between the
assumptions of the theoretical model and real-world investment behavior.
Introducing the distinction between small and large firms goes some way to produce
clearer patterns and to support the notion that the Euler equation is more likely to
fail for smaller firms. For larger firms, the coefficient sizes ofthe first two terms are
15still far from the unit value.15 The cash flow term assumes the predicted negative
sign for the larger firms while it is positive in the other subsample, but the
coefficients are insignificant in both cases. While the estimates are quite imprecise
overall, it is nonetheless clear that the subsample of larger firms corresponds much
better to the expected patterns. In terms ofsign restrictions derived from theory, only
the last two R&D terms carry the wrong sign, but they are jointly insignificant
(p=O.302). Nesting both estimates by using a full set of size interaction terms and
testing the significance of the interacted terms indicates that the coefficient vectors
for the two subsampIes differ in statistical terms (p=O.03). Since the test statistics
indicate second-order serial correlation in the subsample of smaller firms, I also
estimated the Euler equation with instruments lagged at least 3 periods. However,
there was no improvement in the test statistic, suggesting that other sources of
misspecification may be present as well. Recall that the larger firms did not show any
sign offinancing constraints for investment in Table 4 and 5, while the smaller firms
appeared to be affected by such effects. Thus, while the investment estimates in
Table 6 are still far from being satisfactory, they are not grossly inconsistent with the
previous results.
The results from the R&D Euler equations are not informative. Again, the
specification for the overall sample does not perform well, and in this case there is no
sign of major improvement once the equation is estimated for the subsamples.
Changing the instrument set (e.g. in the third column ofthe right-hand side panel in
Table 6) in order to avoid problems from second-order correlation of the error terms
also did not lead to any improvement.
Taken together, the results ofthe Euler tests are disappointing. Clearly, the sample
_is still relatively small, and the estimation approach required consumes a large
number of degrees of freedom. Differencing and the use of lagged values as
instruments subtracts at least two observations from each time series. On the
positive side, the sample split according to firm size appears to move the coefficient
estimates for capital investment by larger firms in the right direction. But they are
still far from the expected value under the null hypothesis of no financing
constraints. Note that this result is consistent with the previous estimates - the
weakest evidence ofcash flow effects on investmentwas found for large firms.
Assuming that the rejection of the Euler equations for smaller firms is driven by
financing constraints, there are a number ofexplanations why they also fail for larger
firms. That subsample may still contain some firms which experience genuine
financing constraints. Detection and identification ofthese firms may require the use
of additional variables on capital structure and other firm characteristics. Note also
that the failure of the Euler equations is particularly clear for the R&D equation.
This may point to problems in either the theoretical formulation of the R&D law of
motion (see the appendix) or in the measurement of the capital stock. Longer time
series would definitely be helpful towards mitigating existing data problems and
exploring alternative specifications.
15 Some experiments with different estimators (e.g. the Blundell-Bond (1995) GMM system estimator)
suggest that the results improve considerably once other estimation techniques are employed. But
even in this case, the coefficients for the subsample ofsmaller firms are significantly below the unit
value suggested by theory.
165.3 Additional Evidencefrom Survey Data
Given that the cash flow effects emerging from Table 4 and 5 are not unambiguous
and that the Euler equation framework does not deliver completely reliable results
either, it may be helpful to look for additional evidence on the role offirm size for the
relationship between finance and investment. Such indirect evidence is available
from an innovation survey conducted in 1995 in Germany. In this postal survey,
respondents (mostly R&D managers) were asked whether a lack ofequity or ofdebt
finance was a serious impediment to their innovation projects. The answers ranged
from "not at all" to "very much" with five ordinal response categories. For 51 firms in
the sample used in this study, data from the 1995 survey could be matched. 29
percent ofthe small firms (according to the definition used in Table 5) in this sample
responded that there were debt constraints (i.e. marked either of the two highest
response categories), but only 5 percent of the larger firms did so. The difference is
significant at the level of p=O.022. Similarly, 36 percent of the smallest firms
indicated that lack of equity capital was an impediment for innovation activities,
while again only 5 percent of the larger firms-did so (p=O.005). I also employed
ordered logit models with a dummy variable for the group ofthe smallest firms (as in
Table 5) as the independent variable. It turns out that the coefficient for this dummy
variable is significant at the level of p=O.Oll for the equity question and at the level
of p=O.023 for the debt question. Thus, these subjective responses appear to support
the result that small firms have a higher propensityofbeing financially constrained.
Much can be said against the cash flow effects presented above in Table 4 and Table
5, and serious objections may be raised against using subjective survey responses.16
Nonetheless, the evidence from both sources is consistent and provides tentative
support that the cash flow effects detected in the panel data are indeed an outcome of
financing constraints at the firm level. However, important limitations remain and
call for more direct evidence than can be provided via this relatively small sample of
firms for which we observe survey data.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The present analysis has been limited in many ways, mostly due to data constraints
that will hopefully be relaxed over time. The sample used here is not representative,
and thus the results need to be taken with a grain ofsalt. While all ofthese caveats
call for a cautious interpretation of the results, the existing evidence suggests that
firm size has a potentially strong impact on the relationship between cash flow and
investment in physical and knowledge capital. For the group of smaller firms, there
appears to be some sensitivity of R&D and of investment to the firm's cash flow.
While this result can be rationalized by pointing to the basic ambiguity in inter-
preting cash flow effects, it is much harder to explain the differences between results
for smaller and larger firms on this basis. Explaining this result away would amount
to assuming that cash flow has no (or a negligible) investment demand component for
larger firms, but indeed some informational content about investment opportunities
16 The evidence concerning the subjective responses is of course ambiguous because even in the
absence ofany informational asymmetries, one would expect that the group ofsmall firms includes
a relatively large number of"lemons". Whether the identity ofthese is known to external financiers
or not, enterprises in this group ofsmall firms will - on average - face greater financing problems
than larger firms would.
17for the group of smaller firms. This notion appears somewhat odd. Moreover, the
survey evidence summarized in section 5.3 provides suggestive evidence that smaller
firms may indeed be facing financing constraints in Germany. For larger firms, the
evidence is broadly consistent with the results reported by Bond et al. (1997) for a
sample of German stock market firms. One should also note that the Jensen
hypothesis of free cash flow would not lend itself easily to an explanation of these
results, either, unless one assumes that free cash flow is a particularly astute
problem for relatively small firms. Since these firms are presumably less likely to
suffer from intransparencies ofmanagerial behavior than larger ones, an explanation
based on differences in the extent offree cash does not seem particularly plausible.
However, to distinguish between the competing hypotheses more clearly, it is
necessary to implement structural models of investment and R&D behavior. This
paper attempted to do so by deriving specifications for investment and R&D Euler
equations. With the exception of the subsample of large firms in the case of capital
investment, the parameter restrictions implied by this model do not appear to be
consistent wit~ the data. While such a rejection could be caused by financing
constraints, it is probably more realistic to argue that the sample is too small for a
precise estimation of the Euler equation coefficients, or that the model itself is too
restrictive to describe the complexity of investment processes in a satisfactory way.
Since it is desirable to include German firms not traded in the stock market, it seems
fruitful to explore as an alternative the applicability of the structural approach
pioneered by Abel and Blanchard (1986). In this approach a separate equation for
estimating the shadow value of capital needs to be implemented, and the predicted
values are then used as a substitute ofTobin's q.
Finally,'international comparisons as in Bond et al. (1997) may constitute a produc-
tive approach to the question posed in this paper. It should be particularly instructive
to study differences between firms in countries with market-based financing systems
(e.g. the U.S. and the United Kingdom) and systems which relie strongly on links
between banks and firms (e.g. in continental Europe). In such a comparison, the
investment demand component of the cash flow variable can presumably be
controlled for by choosing appropriate groups of firms for between-country
comparisons.
If these avenues are pursued further, a stronger case for or against the existence of
financing constraints in German firms can presumably be made. At this point, there
is some weak evidence that such constraints may exist for investment in capital
goods in relatively small firms, but the empirical results are still far less than
satisfactory.
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218 DATAAPPENDIX
In 1985, several changes were introduced into German corporate law (§289
Handelsgesetzbuch) , most of them triggered by the European Community's Fourth
Company Law directive on harmonization of national requirements pertaining to
financial statements. Thus starting in the fiscal year of 1987, all limited liability
corporations (Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung - GmbHs) and stock-based
corporations (Aktiengesellschaften - AGs) had to submit their annual financial
statements to the Commercial Register. Only the larger firms have to have their
statements audited, smaller ones need not submit a statement of profits and losses,
and the balance sheet can be abbreviated significantly. Medium-sized and large
GmbHs are required to publish their statements in the Bundesanzeiger. The size
requirements are satisfied if two or more of the following conditions are met:
revenues in excess ofDM 32 million, more than 250 employees, or balance-sheet total
in excess ofDM 15 million.
A discussion o(the situation of the business (Lagebericht) is part of the published
statement. Besides establishing new publication requirements, the 1985 law also
requires firms to comment on their R&D acitivities (§289 Hanaelsgesetzbuch, para 2).
However, there is no legal specification as to the format ofR&D reporting.
The data used in this paper originate with financial statements and respective
appendices published in the Bundesanzeiger. To obtain the respective data, the 1993
volume of the Bundesanzeiger was searched for any published statements that
indicated R&D activities. These roughly 900 records provided the "master list" of
companies for the data collection. The statements of these companies were then
tracked backwards to 1987 and forward to 1994. Whenever companies provided
quantitative items on their R&D activities, the record was entered into the database.
A list ofcompanies which had published similar information in 1987 was provided by
B. Schwitalla and H. Grupp and used to check the completeness of our own data
search. See Schwitalla (1993) for a description ofthe 1987 cross-section.
Quantitative data on R&D activity were recorded from the Bundesanzeiger if one or
several of the following items were available: i) R&D expenditures, ii) R&D
employees, iii) R&D intensity with respect to sales, iv) R&D intensity with respect to
total number of employees, v) growth rates of any ofthese indicators. For about 200
firms, comparable data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) were available
for two or more years. A comparison ofthe R&D figures from the two sources yielded
the result that the Bundesanzeiger figures were less frequently rounded off than the
survey data. Moreover, whenever the business responding to the survey could be
matched in terms ofemployees and revenues (about 150 cases), the R&D figures were
nearly identical, leaving aside rounding errors in the survey responses. Since the MIP
survey explicitly asks for R&D according to the Frascati definitions, the
correspondence between the two sources is reassuring.
Since the operationalization of the theoretical model requires data on R&D
expenditures, the respective information had to be imputed for a small number of
cases (l05 out of 2300) for which it was not available directly. In the case ofitems ii)
and iv), industry-specific regression coefficients from a previous analysis of the 1987
and 1989 Stifterverband surveys were used to impute R&D expenditures from R&D
personnel data. These regression results are available upon request. As one should
expect, the number of R&D employees and R&D expenditures are highly correlated
22(p=0.98), and inclusion oftime and industry dummies in these regressions generates
a good fit.
The data obtained from the Bundesanzeiger were matched to commercially available
balance sheet data published by Creditreform, a large credit rating agency. While the
Bundesanzeiger entries contain in principle all of the necessary data, it was not
feasible to enter the full balance sheet information for these companies. Thus the
availability of the matching information in the Creditreform database is currently
still a constraint for about 300 observations.
Investment (/). The data on additions to plant, property and equipment came from
the detailed Anlagenspiegel tabulation of assets in each of the Bundesanzeiger
entries. The tabulation also includes their value at historical cost.
Output (Y). Computing time series for output (sales) followed the suggestions in the
data appendix of Bond et al. (1994). The deflators used for computing real output
were at the two-digit SYPRO level.
Cash Flow (CF).For the purpose ofthe regressions in sections 4.1 and 4.2, cash flow is
computed as funds available for investment and R&D spending, Le. as net income
plus depreciation plus R&D expenditures. The latter correction is necessary, since
R&D is expensed in Germany (as in the U.S., see Himmelberg and Petersen 1994,
Hall 1992). Obviously, this does not hold for the investment portion (buildings, plant
and equipment) ofR&D laboratories, but the respective share ofthese expenditures is
below 10 percent. Note that a correction of the cash flow variable would also
necessitate reducing the physical investment figures by the corresponding amount. I
experimented with such a correction ofthe investment and cash flow variables for the
investment share of the R&D budget, but the results presented in this paper do not
change in any major way. For that reason, the simpler procedure is followed here.
Gross Profit 00. For the estimation of the Euler equations described in section 4.3,
the theoretical derivation of the model implies that the most appropriate measure is
given as gross operating profits. For the data used here, the measure was computed
as cash flow (see above) plus interest plus tax payments.
The capital stock (C) measure was computed by adjusting the historic cost values
taken from the Anlagenspiegel for inflation, and by applying a perpetual inventory
procedure with a depreciation of8 percent per annum for all years following the first
year for which historic cost data were available. The choice of this depreciation rate
reflects average economic depreciation across German industries.
The knowledge capital stocks (K) in 1987, the initial year of most of the time series
observations, were again computed from a permanent growth apptoximation as in
Harhoff (1997), assuming a pre-sample growth rate of 6 percent for all firms. Stock
data for the following years were computed on the basis of perpetual inventory
calculations, using a depreciation rate of 15 percent. Note that the data do not allow
for a correction ofthe double-counting problem - a small portion ofR&D expenditures
(on average about 10 percent in Germany) is capital investment and thus included in
the stock of phyisical capital. See Schankerman (1981) for a discussion of potential
distortions arising from this problem.
Exclusion procedures. From the data thus constructed, any overlapping entries were
deleted. Priority was given to consolidated financial statements whenever possible,
though the database still contains a large number of nonconsolidated statements, in
23particular when comparability over time requires their use. Non-profit firms and
subsidiaries offoreign firms were deleted as well. For the purpose ofthis study, only
manufacturing firms were included.
Cleaning procedures and sample trimming. Observations were excluded if the
following variables were below the lower centile or beyond the upper centile of the
respective distribution: 1/C, CF/ C and the output growth rate.
Final Analysis at the Firm Level. The fact that some subsidiaries report their R&D
expenditures in the Bundesanzeiger can be troublesome for any kind of analyis of
R&D or financial performance. In this particular case, the relationship between cash
flow and R&D might be affected by strategic issues or attempts to minimize overall
taxes by strategic choice oftransaction prices, etc. Moreover, the delination of R&D-
performing units may be affected. In order to exclude cases in which problems were
likely to occur, all firms that had passed the above selection and cleaning procedures
were analyzed individually. Data on ownership structure from Creditreform was used
to detect subsidiaries. Data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel was consulted to
rule out cases in which R&D for a subsidiary was conaueted by other business units
or centralized R&D facilities. Cases that were deemed to problematic to deal with or
sufficiently suspect were discarded. By applying this final cleaning procedure, the

























Sectoral Composition ofthe Sample
Sector
Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals
Plastic and Rubber Products
Mining, Quarrying, Ceramic Products
Petroleum Refineries




Electrical Products, Precision and Optical Goods
Ironware, Sheet Metal
Wood Products, Pulp, Paper and Paperboard,
Printing and Duplication, Leather, Leatherware,
Footware, Textiles and Apparel


















(215 Firms - 1990)
Variable Mean S.E. Lower Median Upper
Quartile Quartile
IIC 0.139 0.105 0.075 0.108 0.174
CFIC 0.302 0.256 0.160 0.232 0.341
ric 2.637 2.083 1.400 1.949 2.965
RiC 0.136 0.139 0.050 0.093 0.179
RIK 0.199 0.093 0.173 0.201 0.221
IIR 1.824 2.439 0.618 1.156 2.024
y 3660.4 10620.0 157.8 445.7 1695.2
I 229.1 698.6 7.8 28.0 91.5
R 163.6 577.0 7.2 18.8 72.5
C 2246.1 7110.4 74.5 196.9 870.1
K 831.8 3013.2 36.8 94.2 327.4
Employees 15006 43862 791 2291 6909
Net Book Value 1000.9 3222.5 32.6 94.9 477.1
(PPE)
Note: Absolute values for Y, I, R, C, K and net book value (PPE) in 1985 million DM. All capital ratios




Dependent Variable ItlCt- 1 Dependent Variable Rt/Kt- 1
Full Sample Smaller Larger Firms Full Sample Smaller Larger Firms
Firms Firms
It-J!Ct- 2 -0.051 -0.087 0.429 Rt- J/Kt- 2 0.152 0.054 0.258
(0.055) (0.051) (0.178) (0.114) (0.132) (0.137)
CF,/Ct- 1 0.178 0.126 0.072 CF,/Kt- 1 0.022 0.065 0.025
(0.192) (0.199) (0.104) (0.021) (0.024) (0.015)
CF,-J!Ct- 2 0.314 0.322 0.080 CF,-J/Kt- 2 0.027 0.032 0.014
(0.063) (0.065) (0.138) (0.020) (0.036) (0.010)
AYt -0.016 -0.021 -0.012 AYt 0.020 -0.007 0.029
(0.082) (0.096) (0.056) (0.035) (0.033) (0.030)
AYt-l -0.002 -0.006 0.012 AYt-l 0.007 0.008 -0.008
(0.073) (0.093) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017)
Test Statistics TestStatistics
Sargan Test 39.0 (37) 41.3 (37) 43.2 (37) SarganTest '44.9(37) 39.5 (37) 35.5 (37)
p=0.381 p=0.287 p=0.22'4 p=0.176 p=0.361 p=0.540
1st Order -2.219 -2.363 -1.832 1stOrder -2.053 -1.458 -2.809
Serial Corr. Serial Corr.
2nd Order -1.753 -1.616 0.410 2nd Order 1.246 0.649 0.875
Serial Corr. Serial Corr.
Wald Test on p<O.OOl p<O.OOl p=0.785 Wald Test on p=0.161 p=0.017 p=0.057
Cash Flow Terms Cash Flow Terms
Observations 673 306 367 Observations 673 306 367
Firms --(213) (106) (107) Firms (213) (106) (107)
Instruments t-2 ...t-5 t-2 ...t-5 t-2 ...t-5 Instruments t-2 ...t-5 t-2 ...t-5 t-2 ...t-5
Note: Estimation in first differences usingthe DPD software (Arellano and Bond 1988). All regression include time dummy variables for the
respective years ofobservation. The sample was split at the median ofinitial year sales.
27Table 4
Error Correction Models
Dependent Variable It/Ct-J Dependent Variable Rt/Kt- J
Full Sample Smaller Firms Larl!er Firms Full Sample Smaller Firms Larl!er Firms
It-I/Ct- 2 -0.204 -0.223 -0.129 Rt- J/ Kt- 2 -0.234 -0.244 -0.191
(0.114) (0.124) (0.153) (0.104) (0.154) (0.157)
CF,/Ct- I 0.010 -0.001 -0.088 CF,/Kt- I 0.003 0.050 0.023
(0.263) (0.263) (0.134) (0.027) (0.019) (0.015)
CF,-dCt-2 0.141 0.214 -0.117 CF,-J/Kt- 2 0.025 0.029 0.018
(0.113) (0.136) (0.129) (0.018) (0.024) (0.010)
.1Yt -0.069 -0.038 0.113 .1Yt 0.078 0.026 0.080
(0.114) (0.090) (0.054) (0.057) (0.054) (0.034)
.1Yt-1 -0.003 -0.024 0.231 .1Yt-1 0.136 0.044 0.124
(0.132) (0.124) (0.097) (0.080) (0.079) (0.060)
ct-2 - Yt-2 -0.252 -0.240 -0.417 kt- 2- Yt-2 -0.248 -0.229 -0.236
(0.158) (0.207) (0.090) (0.070) (0.067) (0.042)
Yt-2 -0.224 -0.257 -0.147 Yt-2 -0.096 -0.175 -0.076
(0.196) (0.182) (0.062) (0.055) (0.087) (0.025)
Test Statistics Test Statistics
Sargan Test 37.2 (37) 39.4 (37) 40.0 (37) Sargan Test 39.7 (37) 38.2 (37) 30.9 (37)
p=0.462 p=0.364 p=0.340 p=0.756 p=0.414 p=0.751
1st Order -1.935 -2.181 -1.717 1st Order -0.298 -0.237 -0.763
Serial Corr. Serial Corr.
2nd Order -1.756 -1.385 0.061 2nd Order 0.928 0.933 0.343
Serial Corr. Serial Corr.
Wald Test on Cash p=0.228 p=0.077 p=0.640 Wald Test on Cash p=0.341 p=0.031 p=0.041
Flow Terms Flow Terms
Observations 673 306 367 Observations 673 306 367
Firms (213) _- (106) (107) Firms (213) (106) (107)
Instruments t-2 ... t-5 t-2 .,. t-5 t-2 ... t-5 t-2 ...£-5 t-2 ...t-5 t-2 ...t-5
Note: Estimation in first differences using the DPD software (Arellano and Bond 1988). All regression include time dummy variables for the
respective years ofobservation. The sample was split at the median ofinitial year sales.
28Table 5
Alternative Sample Split for Investment Error Correction Model
DependentVariable It/Ct-J
Initial Year Sales 208 Mill. DM <= Initial Year Sales
< 208 Mill. DM Initial Year Sales < >= 950 Mill. DM
950 Mill. DM
It-I!Ct- 2 -0.078 -0.412 -0.106
(0.160) (0.122) (0.160)
CF;/Ct- J 0.221 0.048 -0.031
(0.377) (0.091) (0.067)
CF;-dCt-2 0.252 0.157 -0.069
(0.087) (0.080) (0.101)
~Yl 0.014 0.110 0.135
(0.186) (0.061) (0.056)
~Yt-I -0.149 0.147 0.182
(0.201) (0.087) (0.073)
cl-2 - Yt-2 -0.073 -0.351 -0.339
(0.226) (0.102) (0.069)
Yt-2 -0.245 -0.211 -0.125
(0.249) (0.115) (0.059)
Test Statistics
Sargan Test 36.8 (37) 33.0 (37) 37.0 (37)
p=0.481 p=0.656 p=0.117
1st Order -1.966 -1.214 -2.035
Serial Corr.
2nd Order Serial -1.354 -2.195 -1.088
Con.
Wald Test on all p=0.005 p=0.142 p~0.780
Cash Flow Terms
Observations 206 205 262
Firms (71) (71) (71)
Instruments t-2 ... t-5 t-2 ... t-5 t-2 ... t-5
Note: Estimation in first differences using the DPD software (Arellano and Bond 1988). All
regression include time dummy variables for the respective years of observatio~.
29Table 6
Euler Equation Results
Investment Equation R&D Equation
Full Smaller Smaller Larger Full Sample Smaller Smaller Larger Firms
Sample Firms Firms Firms Firms Firms
(I/C)t 0.364 0.191 0.081 0.674 (RIK)t -0.058 0.171 0.292 -0.064
(0.148) (0.170) (0.325) (0.153) (0.304) (0.301) (0.348) (0.259)
(I/C)~
-0.280 -0.074 -0.256 -0.791 (RIK)~
0.381 -0.113 -0.215 0.612
(0.275) (0.307) (0.744) (0.327) (0.706) (0.726) (0.805) (0.689)
(Y/C)t 0.022 0.021 0.013 0.022 (YIK)t -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
(X/C)! -0.010 -0.009 0.0001 -0.001 (X/K)t 0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 0.0003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.0069) (0.014) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0021) (0.0008)
(R/C)t 0.340 0.853 0.576 -0.349 (lIK)t
0.0005 -0.0081 -0.0086 0.0385
(0.300) (0.453) (0.454) (0.393) (0.0088) (0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0163)
(R/C)~
-0.093 -0.538 -0.259 0.876 (1/ K)~
0.0004 0.0015 0.0013 -0.007\
(0.265) (0.407) (0.290) (0.678) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0033)
Test Statistics Test Statistics
Sargan Test 114.0 (102) 103.7 (102) 72.4 (66) 98.2 (102) Sargan Test 128.6 (102) 110.7 (102) 79.4 (66) 98.9 (102)
p=0.196 p=0.435 p=0.275 p=0.589 p=0.278 p=0.717 p=0.434 p=0.920
1st Order -5.410 -4.644 -1.796 -4.532 1st Order -3.361 -2.858 -2.630 -5.822
Serial Corr. Serial Corr.
2nd Order -2.256 -2.329 -3.018 -0.828 2nd Order -1.966 -1.902 -0.386 -0.463
Serial Corr. Serial Corr.
Observations 893 420 298 473 Observations 893 420 298 473
Firms (236) (122) (103) (114) Firms (236) (122) (103) (114)
Instruments t·2•...t·5 t·2....t·5 t·3....t-5 t·2....t·5 Instruments t-2....t·5 t·2 ...t·5 t·3....t·5 t·2 ...t-5
Note: Estimation in first differences using the DPD software (Arellano and Bond 1988). All regression include time dummy variables for the
respective years ofobservation. The sample was split at the median ofinitial year ~alesfor the sample used in Table 3 (see text).
309 APPENDIX: DERIVATION OF THE EULER EQUATIONS
This section derives a structural model ofinvestment and R&D spending in the presence
of financing constraints. To avoid cluttered notation, I will only write subscripts for
years and not use firm subscripts unless clarity requires it. The firm under
consideration in this section has four choice variables. Itcan determine its level ofR&D,
investment, labor, and borrowing. R&D and investment contribute to the build-up ofthe
respective capital stocks. For simplicity, I will refer to the capital stock (stock ofphysical
capital) and the knowledge stock (stock ofR&D capital). The firm faces two constraints.
First, dividend payments are non-negative. The respective shadow value ofdividends is
then equivalent to the shadow value ofinternal funds. Second, the firm possibly faces an
exogenously given borrowing constraint which limits investment spending if internal
funds are exhausted. By definition, the firm cannot issue new equity. This restriction
simply acknowledges that issuing of new equity is a rare event in German corporations
and therefore not too interesting for the model at hand.
The per period profit ofthe firm is given by
where Pt is the price ofone unit ofoutput, Ct is the stock ofphysical capital, Kt is the
knowledge capital stock, and L, is labor with unit cost wt . The firm utilizes a production
function F(Ct ,Kt ,L,) with constant returns to scale and faces adjustment costs
captured by the cost function G(It, Rt,Ct,Kt ) where It is investment in physical capital
and Rt is the firm's R&D expenditures. The effective prices ofinvestment and R&D are
given by pI and pf, respectively.
The balance ofsources and uses offunds is specified in
(A.2) Dt = 0t + Bt - (1 +(1- 'tt)it- J)Bt- J
where Dt are the firm's dividend payments, Bt is the amount borrowed in period t, 'tt
is the corporate tax rate, and it is the interest on borrowed funds. Capital market
arbitrage (neglecting capital gains and new equity issues) requires the cumulated
dividend value ofthe firm Vt to satisfy
(A.3) (1 +(1-111r+))it)(Vt-(I-mt)Dt)=EtVt+).
where 111r is the personal tax rate on interest and dividend income and it is the interest
rate. Solving the arbitrage condition backwards, we can write the value ofthe firm as
(A.4)
where Yt = (1-111r) is the tax preference parameter in the absence of capital gains
taxation and ~~+j =n/=J(1 +'t+i-Jr
J
is the j-period discount factor withj ~ I, ~~ =1and r( =(i - fllr+J )i(. Note that these expressions are simplified versions of
the tax parameters and discount factor in Bond and Meghir (1994).




where OR and oj are the respective rates ofdepreciation. Note that knowledge capital
and physical capital are treated analogously here, as has been done in most ofthe R&D
literature,17 In order to prevent the firm from borrowing and paying the borrowed funds




lim n~~+j BT = 0, Vt
T~oo j=O
holds. Given initial conditions at the beginning of period t, the Bellmann equation
characterizes the net presentvalue ofthe firm as
(A.8)




As Stokey and Lucas (1989, ch. 9) show, solving the maximization program in (AS) is a
necessary condition for maximizing the value ofthe firm given in (A4). They also state
the corresponding regularity conditions on functional forms and stochastic shocks.
Assuming that managers maximize the value of the firm, we obtain the first-order
condition for optimal borrowing
(All)
17 This specification for the R&D capital stock is not the only feasible way to portray the transformation
law for knowledge capital. For example, Hall and Hayashi (1989) and Klette (1996) have suggested to
specify the law of motion as K r = Kl=FRf, a,p E (0, I) where a is the rate ofdepreciation of the log
capital stock. This functional form assumption has been proposed to capture the non-exclusive
character ofthe existing knowledge stock which presumably does not only enter in production ofoutput
but also in the production ofnew knowledge.
IINote that the last left-hand side term stems from the assumed borrowing constraint.
While the equations will not be estimated under the alternative hypothesis of binding
financing constraints, it is nonetheless instructive to study (A.ll) in detail. Consider the
case in which borrowing constraints are not binding, i.e. 'A.f =o. With perfect capital
markets and risk neutrality, the after tax return on equity and the after-tax return on
debt will be equal and (A.II) simplifies to (Yt +'A.?)- Et{(Yt+1 +"Af+1)} = 0, Le. the
marginal value of dividend payments will be equalized over time. Once borrowing
constraints are present, the respective shadow values will no longer be equal. Again
assuming perfect capital markets and risk neutrality, we have
(1t +"A.?)- Et{(YHJ + "A.f +"A.f+l)} = 0 in this case. The multiplier "A.f simply reflects the
change in the value ofthe firm ifthe debt constraintwere relaxed by one unit.
The two Euler equations for investment and R&D can be written as
(AI2)
(A.l3)
Combining these with the first-order conditions for investment and R&D yields
( 81)f3t {( )..,0 )dUt+1}_ ( )..p)drrt ( Ap)drrt
(AI4) -1- HIEt Yt+l+ t+l ----;--1] -- Yt+ t ~- Yt+ t :v-
(7. t+l (7. t Ul.-t
( 5:R)f3t {( 10 )dUHJ } _ ( 10)dUt ( 10)dnt (AtS) -1-u t+lEt Yt+l+lI.t+J -')-- -- Yt+lI.t ---:;--- Yt+lI.t ~.
d~+1 d~ d~
Towards an empirical implementation, the expectations term will be replaced by
observables and a rational expectations error. Expectations Et are formed over future
prices, technologies, and interest rates on the basis of information available at the
beginning ofperiod t.
To obtain an empirically useful specification, several other functional form assumptions
are necessary. The adjustment cost function is specified as
(A.16)
which is linearly homogeneous in its arguments. Additive separability is a matter of
convenience here, since one may very well construct cases in which interaction between
physical capital and R&D capital could matter. The output price Pt depends on the
volume of output in order to allow for imperfect competition, i.e. Pt = rr-l/£ where € is
IIIthe price elasticity of demand and Y=F-G is net output. Then the profit derivatives of
the firm's profit with respect to investment and capital stock are given by
(AI?)
(AI8)
where Jl = (l-lj£). The expressions for R&D ~re analogous. We still have to find an
operationalization for the marginal terms in equation (A.18). Note that both gross
output F and adjustment costs G are homogeneous of degree one. Let
<pC = (JY/JCt )(Cr/Ye) denote the elasticity ofnet output with respect to physical capital.
Taking account ofthe functional form specification for adjustment costs and ofthe first-
order condition for the optimal allocation ofvariable fac~orsL we can show that
Again, the R&D equation is analogous. Under the null hypothesis of no financing
constraints and time-invariant tax regimes, the derived expressions can be used to
obtain the following equation:
-(1- OI)~~+1Et{-bC!!Pt+1 1t+1 +bCyC!! Pt+1 - P!+1} =
Cr+1
(A.20) -(-bC!!Pr ~r +bCyC!! Pr - p!)-
JlPr[(I-<pK)~__ I_wLr +bK(Rr)2_bKyK Rt +bc(lL)2_bCyclL]
Ct !!Pt Ct Cr Ct Ct Ct





IVwhich will be greater than one for realistic values of the variables. The ratio of gross
profit to capital, evaluated in real terms, is given by (xtlet)= (Pt~ - wILt)/ptKt • The
user costs ofphysical capital are captured in
(A.23)
This term will not be included explicitly, since price and depreciation data are not
available at the firm level. The user cost term is simply captured by firm-specific effects
and time dummies. The empirical specification for the investment equation under the
null hypothesis ofno financing constraints is thus given by
(A.24)
Analogously, one can derive the empirical equation for the firm's R&D spending
(A.25)
The coefficients should - under the null hypothesis - satisfy the restrictions ~1 >1,
~2 <-1, ~3 <0, ~4 >0, ~5 >0, and ~6 < 0 where superscripts have been neglected,
since these restrictions apply to both equations symmetrically.
v